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SMART BORDERS, VIRTUAL BORDERS OR
No BORDERS: HOMELAND SECURITY




N the wake of the September 11th attacks on the World Trade Center
and the Pentagon, the United States rapidly stiffened its border con-
trols. Given the initial perception in the United States that the Cana-
dian border was a sieve through which terrorists could easily pass, the
United States redeployed Border Patrol officers to the U.S.-Canadian
border. While the initial response to September 11 involved a massive
increase of inspections at border crossings with Canada, this quickly led
to traffic back-ups of fifteen hours at the border - delays that could not
be economically sustained.
In response to these conflicting security and economic imperatives, dis-
cussions between the United States and Canada increasingly explored the
possibility of building a "North American Perimeter" modeled after the
European Union, whereby internal border controls are lifted as a com-
mon external border is established. These talks shifted focus toward in-
ternational cooperation that would leverage information technology,
yielding an "Action Plan for Creating a Secure and Smart Border," which
was announced on December 12, 2001 (White House 2002a). The initia-
tives to create a "Smart Border" of the future became a central feature of
the subsequent National Homeland Security Strategy (White House
2002b). According to a White House statement:
*This article is a revised version of a paper "International Cooperation to Create
Smart Borders," prepared for the conference on North American Integration:
Migration, Trade and Security, organized by the Institute for Research on Public
Policy (IRPP), Ottawa April 1-2, 2004. It incorporates insights and information
from a May 2004 visit to Canada supported by the Canada Institute of the
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. The research for this paper
was supported by a fellowship from the Woodrow Wilson International Center for
Scholars. I am very grateful to the Wilson Center for its support. The paper also
incorporates information gathered in November 2004 visit to the Detroit-Windsor
area funded by the Migration Policy Institute to whom I am very grateful.
** Associate Professor of Political Science, Rockefeller College of Public Affairs and
Policy, University at Albany (SUNY). He also holds a joint appointment in
UAlbany's College of Computing and Information. He is also Director of the
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The border of the future must integrate actions abroad to screen
goods and people prior to their arrival in sovereign US territory, and
inspections at the border and measures within the United States to
ensure compliance with entry and import permits . . .Agreements
with our neighbors, major trading partners, and private industry will
allow extensive pre-screening of low-risk traffic, thereby allowing
limited assets to focus attention on high-risk traffic. The use of ad-
vanced technology to track the movement of cargo and the entry and
exit of individuals is essential to the task of managing the movement
of hundreds of millions of individuals, conveyances, and vehicles
(White House 2002).
In a dramatic illustration of the Administration's agenda, Richard
Falkenrath, former Deputy Assistant to the President and Deputy Home-
land Security Advisor, drew an analogy likening the revolution in military
affairs of the 1990s to the "revolution in border security" that is taking
place now.1
With respect to border control, the U.S. National Homeland Security
Strategy is largely based on policy proposals to "push U.S. borders out"
(Flynn 2000) beyond U.S. territorial boundaries. U.S. border control au-
thorities have deputized airline agents to inspect the travel documents of
United States-bound passengers. There has been increasing forward de-
ployment of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) as well
as Customs and Border Protection (CBP) officers, and the information
technology to support them, such as electronic submission of passenger
and cargo manifests in advance of departure to the United States. The
electronic submission of data, collection of biometrics at U.S. consulates
abroad, and development of an automated entry-exit system was increas-
ingly described by the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
officials in terms of the emergence of "virtual borders."'2
In this paper, I consider the options of developing smart borders, mov-
ing toward virtual borders, and eliminating border controls between the
United States and Canada. I argue that smart borders cannot be totally
virtual and significant physical infrastructure investments at the border
will be necessary in order to enable new technologies to work their magic.
These barriers have become particularly apparent through analysis of the
new entry-exit system, US-VISIT, which was not part of the original
Smart Border agreements but is now becoming the largest DHS informa-
tion technology deployment. Moreover, the smart borders approach is
1. Richard Falkenrath, Response to author's question at "Transatlantic Homeland
Security? European Approaches to 'Total Defense,' 'Societal Security' and their
Implications for the U.S." Center for Transatlantic Relations, Paul H. Nitze
School of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University (Feb. 19,
2004).
2. Customs and Border Protection Commissioner Robert Bonner used the term "vir-
tual borders" in remarks at reception preceding the 2003 Customs and Border Pro-
tection Trade Symposium, Nov. 19, 2003 and the term was used extensively in US-
VISIT Office, Department of Homeland Security, Request for Proposals for US-
VISIT Program Prime Contractor, RFP No. HSSCHQ-04-R-0096 (Nov. 28, 2003).
See also DHS 2003a.
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not necessarily complementary with proposals for a "North American Pe-
rimeter," even though they are often conflated in the broader context of
bilateral cooperation between the United States and Canada.
II. BORDER CONTROL AFTER SEPT. 11, 2001, AND THE
"SMART BORDERS" RESPONSE
The DHS was established to increase transportation and border secur-
ity, minimize the risk of another terrorist attack, and prepare to respond
to any future attacks that may occur. The DHS' Bureau of Customs and
Border Protection (CBP) has the task of intercepting terrorists at over
300 ports of entry and along the 5,525 mile U.S.- Canadian Border and
the 1,989 mile U.S. - Mexican border. During the 1990s, the total U.S.-
Canadian surface trade increased from $223 billion to $347 billion (DHS
2003) while the overall volume of U.S. international trade doubled.
Given that Customs inspection personnel increased only by 7 percent
during the decade (MITRE 2000), CBP screened potentially dangerous
cargo and people out of the flows of legitimate trade and travel with only
three-fifths of the human resources relative to the increased flows.
Moreover, the attacks demonstrated the vulnerability of the U.S. econ-
omy to shutdowns of the transportation system. The grounding of com-
mercial air traffic and heightened border security after the September
11th attacks amounted to the United States doing to itself what no enemy
has done before: an embargo on trade (Flynn 2002). This self-embargo
demonstrated the vulnerability of extended supply chains and trans-bor-
der just-in-time manufacturing, most dramatically on the U.S.-Canadian
border. Up to ten million vehicles annually cross the Ambassador Bridge
between the Windsor, Ontario and Detroit, Michigan, along with approx-
imately 25 percent of U.S.-Canadian merchandise trade. Shortly after the
attacks, traffic backed up to fifteen hours at the U.S.-Canadian border.
Within days of the attacks, Daimler-Chrysler announced that it would
have to stop several U.S. assembly lines for want of Canadian parts
caught in the traffic back-ups at the border. Ford followed suit shortly
thereafter.
In terms of growing flows of people, 440 million people entered the
United States through U.S. ports of entry and a total of 358,373,548 en-
tered through land ports with Canada and Mexico during fiscal year 2002
(DHS 2003: 1, 16). It has been estimated that there are now 9.6 million
undocumented migrants in the United States (Passel, Capps, Fix 2004),
about 30 to 40 percent of whom entered legally but overstayed their visas.
The September 11 attacks exposed the security consequences of increas-
ing migration and travel, as terrorists used the same modalities of visa
abuse and identity document fraud characteristic of illegal migration to
the United States. At least two of the hijackers used fraudulent passports
(9/11 Commission 2004): one with a student visa never showed up for
class; three had stayed in the United States after their visas expired; and
several purchased fraudulent New Jersey driver's licensees and Virginia
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ID's on the black market that primarily services illegal migrants. Al-
Qaeda operated a "passport office" at the Kandahar airport to alter
travel documents and train operatives, like Mohamad Atta (9/11 Com-
mission 2004a: 169). Contrary to the initial discussions that all the 9/11
hijackers entered legally and that border controls were irrelevant to their
entry, the 9/11 Commission concluded that "15 of the 19 hijackers were
potentially vulnerable to interception by border authorities" (9/11 Com-
mission 2004a: 384).
It became clear that terrorists could take clandestine routes used by
transnational criminal organizations to smuggle illegal migrants into the
United States. For example, a month after the September 11th attacks,
Italian authorities found Amir Farid Rizk, an Egyptian-born Canadian
national, inside a shipping container bound for Canada along with a
global satellite phone, laptop computer, airport maps, airport security
passes, and an airplane mechanic's certificate. Italian authorities sus-
pected that he was an Al Qaeda operative and arrested him under Italy's
new anti-terrorism law but then released him several weeks later (To-
ronto Star 2001). The case demonstrated how easy it might be for a ter-
rorist to enter the United States in the same way that migrants have been
smuggled in shipping containers. The 9/11 Commission staff report on
terrorist travel details links between human smugglers, AI-Qaeda, and
other terrorist groups in need of travel facilitation (9/11 Commission
2004a).
The post-9/11 approach to border control taken by the Bush Adminis-
tration was perhaps first articulated in the U.S.-Canadian Smart Borders
declaration. The action plan includes using biometric identifiers for per-
manent resident cards and travel documents, sharing advance passenger
information from the U.S. Advanced Passenger Information System
(APIS) and its Canadian counterpart, developing compatible immigra-
tion databases, such as Canada's Support System of Intelligence, and ex-
panding the NEXUS pre-approved passenger vehicle program as well as
the NEXUS air pilot program (White House 2002a). Frequent travelers
who enroll in the NEXUS program submit information for criminal and
terrorist background checks. An enrollee then receives a radio frequency
identification (RFID) proximity card. The RFID tag on this card is read
at the port of entry and pulls up background information and a photo for
an inspector. The inspector can then quickly verify the NEXUS card-
holder's identity and wave him or her through.
The Smart Borders plan is premised on bilateral cooperation that en-
ables the United States to deploy information technology in order to
practice risk management targeting of vehicles, shipments, and travelers,
and to push the United States' "borders out," while at the same time it
attempts to minimize the impact of border controls on trade and travel.
By the spring of 2003, significant strides were made in realizing many of
the specific objectives in the U.S.-Canadian agreement (Meyers 2003).
Further progress on the U.S.-Canadian Smart Border agreement was an-
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nounced on October 3, 2003, highlighted by completed NEXUS imple-
mentations at nine ports of entry (U.S. and Canada 2003). As of
September 2005, there were 11 NEXUS crossings and 80,000 U.S. and
Canadian nationals enrolled in the program (Bonner 2005).
Although the NEXUS program is perhaps the quintessential example
of the smart borders approach, physical infrastructure approaching some
border crossings inhibits participation. For example, when traffic is
backed up on the Ambassador Bridge, drivers enrolled in NEXUS often
cannot get to the NEXUS lane because the bridge lanes (usually two go-
ing each way but can also be switched to three one way and one the
other) are open to all traffic, NEXUS and non-NEXUS alike. This is one
reason that there are more NEXUS program participants at the Blaine,
Washington area crossings than in the Detroit-Windsor area crossings,
even if Detroit-Windsor has a much greater population.
These Smart Border Agreements are complementary, if not integral, to
several major U.S. border security initiatives. In January of 2002, U.S.
Customs Commissioner Bonner announced the Container Security Initia-
tive (CSI) that pre-screens cargo containers at ports of origin or transit
rather than when they reach the United States (Bonner 2002). The In-
Transit Container Security Initiative between the United States and Ca-
nada was a Smart Border Accord action item that deployed U.S. Customs
inspectors in Halifax, Vancouver, and Montreal, Canadian inspectors in
Newark and Seattle, and became a model for CSI.
In April 2002, Commissioner Bonner announced the creation of the
Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT), a public-pri-
vate partnership to increase the security of cargo while facilitating trade.
As Commissioner Bonner put it, "The message should be clear-if a busi--
ness takes steps to secure its cargo against terrorism, we will give it the
"fast lane" through the border (U.S. Customs 2002)." Seven companies
helped to establish the program - BP America, Daimler Chrysler, Ford
Motor Company, General Motors Corporation, Motorola Inc., Sara Lee
Corporation, and Target (U.S. Customs 2002). It is not an accident that
the big three automakers figure prominently among the founders. Over
7,000 companies have signed agreements.
In a certain sense, the forward deployment of U.S. Customs personnel
with the CSI draws on the model of longstanding cooperation between
the United States and Canada on immigration. U.S. immigration inspec-
tors have long operated beyond U.S. borders in Canada. Since an agree-
ment signed in 1894, U.S. inspectors posted at Canadian ports of entry
have inspected U.S.-bound immigrants. Immigration inspectors were
subsequently posted to Canadian airports to conduct "pre-inspections,"
which essentially cleared U.S.-bound passengers flying from abroad and
connecting through Canadian airports. If a person flies into the United
States from Japan via Vancouver or Toronto, he or she will be greeted by
U.S. Customs and Border Protection inspector.
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Point 8 of the U.S.-Canadian Smart Border Agreement outlines an
agenda for cooperation on advanced passenger data, and Point 17 deal
with customs data. The Aviation and Transportation Security Act passed
by Congress in the fall of 2001 requires that airlines with U.S.-bound in-
ternational flights electronically submit a passenger manifest with data
including full name of each passenger, date of birth, sex, passport number
and country of issuance, and U.S. visa number or alien card number.3
The subsequent 2002 U.S. Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Re-
form Act requires commercial airlines and ships to electronically submit
passenger and crew manifests before arrival to the United States via the
Advanced Passenger Information System (APIS), and sets out fines for
non-compliance and loss of landing rights for those airlines that have not
paid their fines. 4
Canada also deployed its passenger information system (PAXIS) at Ca-
nadian airports in October 2002 and began collecting passenger name re-
cord (PNR) data (Auditor General 2004). Canada and the United States
have agreed to share passenger manifests and passenger name records
using an automated data-sharing program that will also assess risks of the
passengers in question (U.S. and Canada 2003). Canada also agreed to
share passenger data with the United States on a case-by-case basis, in
which Canada's PAXIS and the U.S.'s APIS will use risk management
criteria common to both countries in automated risk-scoring of the PNR
data to determine which data will be shared.
In order for CSI's vision of pre-screening containers in the port of ori-
gin to work, CBP needs information about the contents of containers in
order to determine whether or not they should be x-rayed and/or physi-
cally inspected. On December 2, 2002, U.S. Customs instituted a new
regulation requiring advanced electronic submission of cargo manifests
twenty-four hours before U.S.-bound sea containers are loaded (Bonner
2002a). Electronic manifest information must be submitted two hours
before arrival into the United States by train and one hour prior to arrival
for trucks, unless they are in the Free and Secure Trade (FAST) program,
which can submit data up to thirty minutes before arrival. 5 In response to
these advanced electronic data submission requirements, David Bradley,
President of the Canadian Trucking Alliance expressed concern about
these requirements and noted that "if just-in-time becomes problematic,
industry will just ship production to the U.S." (Quoted in Halifax Daily
News 2003). Despite such concerns, companies have managed to meet
advanced data submission requirements. In the future, customs authori-
ties could tap private sector logistics systems to such an extent that bor-
der controls may begin at the point a shipping notice is entered in
manufacturers' inventory, warehousing, and distribution systems.
3. Aviation and Transportation Security Act, Pub. L. No. 107-71, § 115 (2001).
4. Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-173, § 402.
5. Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-210, § 343
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The June 2005 Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America,
which superseded the Smart Border Accords, outlines a set of ambitious
goals for traveler and cargo security. For example, "test technology and
make recommendations, over the next 12 months, to enhance the use of
biometrics in screening travelers destined to North America with a view
to developing compatible biometric border and immigration systems,"
"devise a single, integrated global enrollment program for North Ameri-
can trusted traveler programs within the next 36 months," and complete
"the negotiation of the Canada-U.S. visa information sharing agreement
within 18 months" (Canada, U.S. and Mexico 2005: 30).
In short, the United States and Canada have taken major strides to
implement border control information technologies, share data, and set
out an ambitious agenda. The technological intensity and corresponding
cooperation may very well be the greatest along the border between any
two countries in the world. Nevertheless, this may not be enough, partic-
ularly for the U.S. Congress, which has mandated implementation of
technologies that would go beyond those outlined in the Smart Borders
Accord and the Security and Prosperity Partnership and with expecta-
tions and a schedule that will be difficult, if not impossible, to meet, as
illustrated with the following case study of the implementation of US-
VISIT.
III. VIRTUAL BORDERS: ENTRY-EXIST SYSTEMS
AND US-VISIT 6
Section 110 of the U.S. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Re-
sponsibility Act of 1996 had mandated that the Immigration and Natural-
ization Service (INS) develop an automated entry-exit control system
that would "collect a record of every alien departing the United States
and match the records of departure with the record of the alien's arrival
in the United States."'7 This was to be done by the end of 1998. Congress
pushed back the deadline for implementation of the law in October 1998
after lobbying by U.S. business groups, states, and localities bordering
Canada and Mexico (Cohn 1999). These groups pointed out that register-
ing every person who crosses into the United States from Canada or
Mexico, even using then-existing smart card technology, would still re-
quire enough processing time to back up traffic at the border for hours,
especially at the Detroit-Windsor crossing.8
The Data Management Improvement Act (DMIA) of 2000 amended
section 110, mandating the development of an entry-exit system to be put
in place at all air and seaports by the end of 2003, at the fifty most highly
6. The discussion in this section is more fully developed in Rey Koslowski, Real
Challenges for Virtual Borders, (Migration Policy Institute, MPI Insights, June
2005), available at: http://www.migrationpolicy.org/pubs/Koslowski-Report.pdf.
7. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, § 110.a.1; H. REP. 104-828 § 110 ((1996) (Conf. Rep.).
8. Senate Judiciary Committee Report, submitted with The Border Improvement and
Immigration Act of 1998, S.1360, S. REI. No. 105-197.
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trafficked land ports of entry by the end of 2004, and at all ports of entry
by the end of 2005. In practical terms, however, the DMIA deflected the
creation of a full-fledged entry-exit system with a complete database since
it limited data collection to that which was already being collected by the
INS by existing authorities of law and disallowed collection of any new
entry-exit data.9
The entry-exit tracking system that existed prior to September 11, 2001,
primarily covered passengers arriving by airplane and consisted of a pa-
per 1-94 form stamped at the port of entry. The 1-94 form was supposed
to be collected by the airline upon departure, given to the INS, then sent
by the INS to a contractor who manually entered the data into the
database of the legacy INS Nonimmigrant Information System (NIIS).
Due to lost forms, incomplete or inaccurate data entry, exit by land bor-
der, and incomplete deployment of the system, missing exit data cor-
rupted the database, leaving inspectors with no effective way of knowing
if individuals had overstayed their visas (Bromwich 1999). This was the
case with several of the September l1th hijackers.
In response to the September 11th attacks and the failures of govern-
ment information systems that they exposed, Congress passed and Presi-
dent Bush signed into law entry-exit system provisions in the USA
PATRIOT Act 10 and in the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry
Reform Act of 2002.11 Both pieces of legislation reiterated the DMIA
mandate for implementation of an entry-exit system and added require-
ments for collection of biometrics. The Enhanced Border Security and
Visa Entry Reform Act, passed in the Senate by a margin of 97 to 0 and
in the House 411 to 0. Most recently, the Intelligence Reform and Ter-
rorism Prevention Act of 2004 called for an acceleration of the full imple-
mentation of an automated biometric entry-exit data system, including
collection of biometric exit data from all those required to provide bio-
metrics upon entry; integration of all databases that contain information
on aliens and interoperability with the entry-exit system; policies and pro-
cedures to maintain accuracy and integrity of entry-exit data; frontline
personnel training; and a registered traveler program that is integrated
into the automated biometric entry-exit system.12
In 2003, the DHS established the US-VISIT program to
collect, maintain, and share information on foreign nationals, includ-
ing biometric identifiers, through a dynamic, interoperable system
that determines whether the individual: should be prohibited from
entering the U.S.; can receive, extend, change, or adjust immigration
9. See Data Management Improvement Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-21.
10. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-
56, § 414.
11. Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No.
107-173, § 302.
12. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, H.R. 108-796,
§ 7208.
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status; has overstayed or otherwise violated the terms of their admis-
sion; should be apprehended or detained for law enforcement action;
needs special protection/attention (i.e., refugees) (DHS 2003a: 8).
In accordance with congressional mandates, US-VISIT is being imple-
mented incrementally (DHS 2003a; GAO 2005). Increment 1 of US-
VISIT went live January 5, 2004, when DHS began to collect digital pho-
tographs and fingerprint scan biometrics from those individuals traveling
on a nonimmigrant visa to the United States upon entry at 115 airports
and fourteen seaports. Increment 2A was to deploy equipment and
software at all ports of entry to capture biometric data from machine-
readable travel documents by October 26, 2004, but this deadline was
extended. Increment 2B deployed the entry capabilities of Increment 1
at the fifty highest-volume land ports of entry by December 31, 2004.
Increment 2C involves pilot deployment of a radio frequency (RF) sys-
tem that captures biographical data at exit as well as entry at one or more
land ports of entry by June 30, 2005. Increment 3 extends Increment 2B
capability to the remaining 115 land ports of entry by December 31, 2005.
Increment 4 will be an expanded set of releases of the envisioned, inte-
grated solution to be developed by an Accenture-led team over the com-
ing years.
US-VISIT only added an average of only fifteen seconds to the entry
process and thus did not significantly impair travel flows at the airports
and seaports where it was deployed. By the end of 2004, US-VISIT
processed 16.9 million foreign visitors (DHS 2005). Increment 2B was
rolled out at the fifty busiest land border crossings without any apprecia-
ble disruptions of traffic flows because at land borders, enrollment in US-
VISIT can be performed in secondary inspection since it is only
mandatory for those individuals who require an 1-94. Enrollment in US-
VISIT is only required of those traveling on a regular visa or entering
under the Visa Waiver Program. Enrollment in US-VISIT is not required
of U.S. citizens, permanent resident aliens, visa-exempt Canadian nation-
als, 13 or the seven million plus Mexicans with border crossing cards, who
together constitute the four largest categories of entries. Initially, the re-
quirement for biometric enrollment in US-VISIT upon entry into the
United States did not apply to nationals of the twenty-seven states in the
U.S. Visa Waiver Program who are permitted to enter and stay in the
United States without a visa for up to ninety days. Starting September
30, 2004, the DHS required nationals from Visa Waiver Program coun-
tries to enroll in US-VISIT and submit to a digital photograph and finger
scanning upon entry. In FY2002, regular visa and visa waiver entries con-
stituted only 6.3 million of the 358.3 million total land border entries
(DHS 2003a: 12), or approximately 1.7 percent. If current entry rates
follow recent historical patterns, only 1.5 to 2 percent of those people
13. Canadian nationals entering the United States for short stays are exempt from
most visa requirements and also from US-VISIT; however, those who are entering
the United States on a visa are required to be enrolled in US-VISIT.
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entering the United States over land borders are being enrolled in US-
VISIT.
Although there were no shutdowns at the end of 2004 when US-VISIT
was deployed at the Ambassador Bridge, there could be significant slow-
downs at land borders due to more stringent travel document inspection
made necessary by the need to verify the identity of those exempt from
US-VISIT (i.e., U.S. citizens, legal permanent residents, visa-exempt
Canadians, and Mexicans with border crossing cards). For example, upon
entry at land borders, U.S. citizens may make an oral declaration of their
citizenship, and the inspector, using his or her judgment, may allow the
person to enter if satisfied with the totality of information available or
ask to see proof of citizenship (usually a passport). There are 320,000
records of lost or stolen U.S. passports reported since 2002 (DHS-OIG
2004: 7). Currently, anyone crossing a land border can declare his or her
U.S. citizenship to avoid US-VISIT. In order to address this problem, the
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 stipulates that
as of January 1, 2008, it will be unlawful for U.S. citizens to enter the
United States without bearing a valid U.S. passport or other designated
documentary proof of citizenship. Similarly, all Canadian and Mexican
nationals will be required to present their passports or other proof of
citizenship. 14
When the US-VISIT enrollment exemption for nationals of Visa
Waiver Program countries was eliminated at the end of September 2004,
Canada became the only country whose nationals could enter the U.S.
without submitting biometrics. This made Canadian passports increas-
ingly valuable on the black market serving human smugglers, especially
those issued before the passports with digitized embedded photos began
to be issued in May 2002 and were fully deployed by the end of 2003.
Older passports valid for up to five years from date of issuance have lami-
nated photos that are more easily altered by photo substitution and used
by another person. Increased demand for stolen Canadian passports may
not only present an increasing problem for Canadians traveling abroad;
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police are concerned that criminals and
terrorists may use these passports. There are already more than 25,000
Canadian passports reported lost or stolen each year. Although the Ca-
nadian Passport Office began deactivating lost and stolen passports be-
ginning in April 2003, due to privacy considerations the Passport Office
did not share its list of deactivated passports with Citizenship and Immi-
gration Canada. The inspectors at Canadian ports of entry could not
identify deactivated passports (Auditor General 2004: 31-32).
As of February 2004, data on lost and stolen passports has been manu-
ally entered into RCMP databases (Passport Office 2004), but the 2004
Auditor General report noted high error rates and data entry lags (Audi-
tor General 2004: 31). The 2005 Auditor General Report notes improve-
14. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, H.R. 108-796,
§ 7209 (b).
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ment in that entry lag: reports of lost passports were entered into the
Canadian Policy Information Centre database within thirty-five days on
average as opposed to seventy days during the previous year (Auditor
General 2005: 13-14). If data on lost and stolen Canadian passports are
not also shared with U.S. authorities, Canadian passports stolen in Ca-
nada or abroad could be photo substituted and used by individuals to
enter the U.S. without submitting biometrics or being subject to criminal
and terrorist biometric watch lists.
There is a possibility that US-VISIT exemptions for Canadians could
be terminated. In FY2002, visa-exempt Canadian nationals comprised 14
percent of all entries. The DHS inspector general expressed "concern"
over visa-exempt Canadian travelers and noted the interception of eight
Canadian citizens at airports between January and August of 2004 who
were suspected of terrorist activities. "(B)ecause visa exempt Canadians
are not enrolled in US-VISIT, the likelihood of intercepting those same
Canadian citizens at land (ports of entry) is small" (DHS-OIG 2005: 18).
If, however, Canadians lost their exemption from US-VISIT entry-exit
requirements at land borders, it may be impossible to direct all those who
need to enroll in US-VISIT to secondary inspection because parking
space would quickly fill at many ports of entry and lead to gridlock with
back-ups into the primary inspection booths.
As Geronimo Gutierrez, the undersecretary for North America at the
Mexican Secretariat of External Relations, stated, "We have pre-NAFTA
infrastructure at our borders" (Gutierrez 2004). With new data collection
requirements in addition to increasing trade and travel flows, it may be-
come impossible to process visitors and shipments without backing up
traffic, unless larger secure areas at border crossings are cleared for in-
spection lanes and booths and more bridges and tunnels are built, espe-
cially between the Canada and the United States.
At certain ports of entry such as the Detroit-Windsor Tunnel, the busi-
est passenger crossing on the U.S.-Canada border, there is little space
available on the Detroit side to expand the number of lanes and booths
for secondary or primary inspections. Such physical constraints on ex-
panding existing ports of entry, combined with expectations of increasing
trade and travel over the coming decades, has led to many proposals for
building additional bridges and tunnels between the United States and
Canada, particularly at the Detroit-Windsor crossing. These proposals
have been thwarted by the dynamics of not-in-my-backyard (NIMBY)
interest group politics, the political maneuvering of the privately-held
Ambassador Bridge Company (which seeks to build a new span itself and
minimize competition in the meantime), and a lack of political will on the
part of state and national governments to raise the taxes necessary to
build additional publicly-funded bridges.
Congressional mandates refer to an "automated entry and exit pro-
cess," but there is not yet much of an automated exit process in place at
land borders. At most land border crossings there are currently no facili-
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ties for outbound inspections. The existing exit data collection at land
borders involves those traveling on visas and those under the Visa Waiver
Program depositing their 1-94 forms in drop boxes when they leave, usu-
ally at CBP secondary inspection locations on inbound lanes. At some
crossings into Canada, Canadian inspectors will collect the 1-94 forms and
send the forms across the border to be added to the drop box collection.
Contactors then enter the information written on the forms into a
database, which can be compared to entry records.
Although there are currently no exit controls at most U.S. land bor-
ders, one could envision exit controls at land borders that would mirror
entry controls with the construction of additional lanes and booths, the
installation of biometric readers and workstations, and the hiring of in-
spectors to process departing foreigners and record exit data for US-
VISIT. Instead, the US-VISIT program plans to use RF technology to
expedite travelers through border controls. In January 2005, the DHS
announced planned tests for using RF technology for entry and exit at
land borders (DHS 2005a) and in February issued an environmental as-
sessment statement on the Increment 2C proof of concept at the selected
land ports of entry where it would be piloted (DHS 2005b). Although
RF-enabled exit controls at land borders that do not include a primary
inspection by a DHS officer might save billions of dollars, they cannot
determine whether someone has overstayed or should be apprehended
when leaving because there are limits on what processes can be securely
automated in the collection of exit data. An RF-based exit system may
record the exit of an RF-enabled travel document, but one can only be
certain that the person exiting with the document is the same person who
entered with that document if that person is physically checked against
the picture on the document and the biometric on the chip.
The Increment 3C proof of concept at five land ports of entry proposes
to use automatic identifiers (a-IDs) to register exits. When a foreign na-
tional enters at one of the 2C pilot land ports of entry, he or she will go to
secondary inspection to submit biographical and biometric data for 1-94
processing and will be issued an a-ID. The a-ID will have a number that
is linked to a database with the traveler's biographical and biometric
data. No biographical or biometric data are stored on the a-ID itself.
The system will then register entries and exits of the traveler with the a-
ID when crossing in a vehicle. The RF readers appear to be similar to
those used for EZ-Pass and other automated toll systems, some of which
now read radio frequency identification (RFID) tags on cars passing by at
fifty-five miles per hour.
It is hard to envision how an RF system could automatically "check
out" holders of a-ID cards as they drive through exit lanes and determine
whether the person leaving is the same person who arrived. For example,
a criminal or terrorist could overstay his visa but be registered as having
"checked out" by paying a Canadian national to take his RF-enabled a-
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ID and exit the United States as a passenger of a car driven through the
exit lane into Canada.
To deal with this problem, US-VISIT officials have suggested that a
wireless biometric card could be used. As individuals are enrolled in US-
VISIT upon entry, they would be given an RF-enabled entry-exit card
with a wireless fingerprint reader that could transmit a live read of the
individual's fingerprint as the person exited to verify that the person did
indeed leave with the entry-exit card.15 As drivers and passengers subject
to US-VISIT exit requirements cross the land border out of the United
States, they would put their finger on the finger scan section of the card
as they pass under the RF readers. The reader would collect the data
transmitted from the card and the digitized finger scan biometric. The
biographical data would register an exit to correspond to the individual's
entry, and the finger scan biometric would be matched to the finger scan
collected upon enrollment to verify the identity of the individual exiting.
However, there are no currently available off-the-shelf wireless finger-
print reader cards that are appropriate for the US-VISIT exit process at
land borders, 16 and operable wireless fingerprint exit verification will
have to wait to be part of the final increment of US-VISIT.
Even if such an RF-enabled exit process can be developed, there is a
major problem with its practical application. The proposed RF-enabled
exit process would be very susceptible to deception by those who wish to
register an exit but then overstay their visas. A finger scan reader on a
wireless entry-exit card is much more susceptible to "spoofing" than en-
rollment in US-VISIT at ports of entry. There have been several experi-
ments showing that finger scan readers can be spoofed with fake fingers
made of gelatin and other materials (Van der Putte and Keuning 2000;
Matsumoto, et. al. 2002). Someone could make a fake finger (following
instructions readily available in Internet articles) and have someone drive
it over the border while pressed on the finger scan reader of the wireless
entry-exit card. Antispoofing techniques include supervised enrollment,
enrolling several biometric samples, e.g., two fingers instead of one, and
multimodal biometrics, e.g., facial and fingerprint (Schuckers 2002). En-
rollment in US-VISIT at ports of entry employs all three.
Even if a criminal or terrorism suspect attempted to exit without press-
ing his finger to the finger scan reader or if the RF system registered a
"hit," what could U.S. authorities do if the suspect had already crossed
the border into Canada or Mexico, especially if the individual in question
holds a Canadian or Mexican passport? Are the enforcement measures
in this situation as good as what could be attained with an exit inspection
process that was similar to the entry process (that is, presentation of
travel documents to an inspector, identity check based on facial recogni-
15. Robert Jacksta, U.S. Customs Perspective on US-VISIT, Address at Smart Bor-
ders: The Implementation of US-VISIT and other Biometric Control Systems, Al-
exandria, VA, (Oct. 26-27, 2004).
16. Id.
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tion and fingerprint scan, watch list check, and optional secondary
inspection)?
It is unlikely that a secure land border exit process in which the auto-
mobile does not stop is viable. At best, an automated, self-service exit
station could be envisioned. Individuals could drive up to the exit station;
drivers and passengers could use their wireless entry-exit cards to trans-
mit their finger scans to the RF reader. When the exit is recorded, the
station would print out paper receipts, and the barrier would lift to allow
the car to pass. If the exit generated a lookout hit, the barrier would not
raise and CBP officers could pull the vehicle over for secondary inspec-
tion. This solution would still be susceptible to deception with fake fin-
gers. The only secure solution would be to require supervised collection
of scans of at least two, if not ten, fingers and a digital photo.
The physical limitations of US-VISIT implementation imposed by defi-
cient land border crossing infrastructure, particularly at bridges and tun-
nels in bi-national urban areas, may be partially overcome by intensified
international law enforcement cooperation. Instead of building exit
booths and staffing them with CBP officers to conduct primary exit in-
spections, Canadian Border Services Agency officers could simultane-
ously conduct their entry inspections together with U.S. exit inspections,
so-called "reversed inspections." Canadian officers would collect bio-
graphical and biometric data and enter that exit data into US-VISIT.17
Canada and the United States have already shared in infrastructure de-
velopment at two ports of entry (Oroville, Washington, and Sweetgrass,
Montana) and have agreed to a land pre-clearance pilot project at the
Buffalo-Fort Erie Peace Bridge that will move all U.S. primary and sec-
ondary inspections to the Canadian side of the bridge. For Canadian offi-
cials to assume responsibility for the US-VISIT exit process would
require significant cost sharing and a high level of mutual trust. Never-
theless, it may be the best, if not the only, secure option short of building
and staffing an exit infrastructure comparable to the existing entry
infrastructure.
IV. SMART BORDERS VS. NORTH AMERICAN
SECURITY PERIMETER
Although the idea of a North American perimeter had been discussed
long before September 11, 2001, reactions to the attacks and to the
clampdown by the United States at the border quickly raised the profile
of the discussion. A week after the attacks, former U.S. Ambassador to
Canada Paul Cellucci said in response to a question, "I think that if we
had policies on immigration and refugee status that were more common
we could establish this perimeter to protect the United States and Ca-
nada, and I think that is where we should be headed" (Cellucci 2001).
17. This had been recommended in the DMIA Task Force's first Report to Congress
(INS 2002), at 37, available at http://www.azmc.org/downloads[DMIAReportCon-
gress2002.pdf.
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Canadian business groups were quick to endorse the approach. Perrin
Beatty, President and CEO of the Canadian Manufacturers and Export-
ers (CME) argued, "A perimeter approach to security would ensure the
protection of both Canada and the United States from external threats
while allowing relatively free movement between the two countries" and
88 percent of the respondents to a questionnaire distributed at the CME
convention also favored a North American perimeter (Canadian New-
swire 2001). Members of the Canadian government, however, were not
that interested in adopting harmonized security and immigration policies.
Foreign Affairs Minister John Manley said "the notion that we can some-
how or another solve a perceived problem by something called a perime-
ter is just rather simplistic to me" (quoted in Fraser 2001). After
announcing that Canada and the United States were discussing moves to
reduce the difference between the two in the list of countries whose na-
tionals are required to have a visa for entry, former Immigration Minister
Elinor Caplan remarked, "When you say 'perimeter,' people think the
European model where you erase the internal borders. That is not what
we are talking about" (quoted in Alberts 2001).
In response to the reluctance of the Canadian Government, Fred Mc-
Mahon, Director of the Centre for Globalization Studies at The Fraser
Institute, argued:
Imagine the boost to Canadian businesses if goods could move
across the Canada-US border as quickly as they can the German-
French border. Imagine the convenience for individual Canadians
crossing the border .... The European model would require some
coordination of Canadian immigration policy with that of the United
States, something European nations have already put in place. This
hardly means that immigration policies must be identical in the US
and Canada and Mexico any more than they are identical in Europe
(McMahon 2001).
In comments at a meeting to commemorate the tenth anniversary of
NAFTA, Former Prime Minister Brian Mulroney also weighed into the
debate in favor of a security perimeter saying:
The NAFTA partners must dedicate themselves as a matter of the
greatest urgency to building an area of security in North America,
one that denies terrorism a foothold on our continent and insures
uninterrupted legitimate flows among us. Such common action is
also essential to allow us to protect the great North/South flows of
goods, people, technology that underpins our shared prosperity. Our
internal borders will only be smart if our external perimeter is secure
(Mulroney 2002).
Mr. Mulroney's speech propelled the notion that efforts to modernize
borders between the United States and Canada through the deployment
of new technology must be complemented by building a North American
perimeter through the harmonization of policies. In the rest of this sec-
tion, I will critically examine the European model for North American
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border control and consider the extent to which smart borders are com-
plementary to a North American perimeter.
During the 1980s, intra-European trade and intra-European travel in-
creased while, at the same time, shipments increasingly went by truck and
more Europeans drove cars. This became a recipe for huge backups at
borders as trucks and tourists stopped at borders for passport inspections.
A trans-European shipment could easily involve crossing two or three
borders with waits totaling longer than the time on the road between bor-
ders. Since the European Community (EC) member states had entered
into a customs union in 1968, the cargo that trucks carried was not subject
to duty payments when crossing internal borders. To address this prob-
lem of long border waits, Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands,
and Luxembourg signed an agreement in 1985 in the small Luxembourg
border town of Schengen to gradually abolish internal border checks.
Shortly thereafter the members of the EC signed the 1986 Single Euro-
pean Act, which set out a course for realizing the free movement of goods
by eliminating non-tariff barriers to trade and establishing free movement
in services and persons by 1992.
The rights of nationals of one EC member state to work in another
does not mean unimpeded travel across borders; however, given the
growing lines at the border, there was increasing pressure for EC member
states to lift border controls between states. Therefore, a subset of EC
member states built on the 1985 Schengen Agreement by signing
Schengen Convention in 1990. The Schengen Convention harmonizes
asylum application procedures and mandates that asylum seekers may
only apply in one country. It also calls for a common visa policy, harmo-
nization of policies to deter illegal migration, and an integrated auto-
mated information system so as to coordinate actions regarding
individuals who have been denied entry. All customs controls at internal
borders within the newly established European Union were lifted in 1993,
and the Schengen Convention went into effect in 1995, lifting internal
border controls among its signatory states while establishing a common
external border around them. Mr. McMahon is correct; in order for the
United States, Canada and Mexico to adopt the European model, immi-
gration policies would not have to be identical; however, the European
model presupposes a customs union and requires identical visa policies.
There are some difficult political questions for those who argue for lift-
ing internal border controls within a North American perimeter, begin-
ning with the question of Cuba. Would the United States and Canada be
able to come to agreement the same set of tariffs on goods imported from
Cuba? As to the Canadian case, I will leave this question to those more
knowledgeable of Canadian domestic politics. The prospect of President
Bush proposing to lift the embargo on Cuba for the sake of harmonizing
tariffs with Canada is rather dim, given that the support of those Cuban
Americans who oppose lifting the embargo has been essential to victory
in Republican presidential primaries in Florida as well as winning general
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elections in the swing state of Florida. Even if President Bush were to
expend the political capital to propose lifting the embargo, it is questiona-
ble as to whether or not a sufficient number of Republicans in Congress
would support him. While the election of a Democratic president may
change the political dynamics, if John Kerry had been elected president it
is unlikely that he would have called for lifting the embargo. Although
Kerry was quoted in a 2000 interview calling a reevaluation of the trade
embargo "way overdue," in a radio interview during the 2004 campaign
he stated, "I'm pretty tough on Castro, because I think he's running one
of the last vestiges of a Stalinist secret police government in the world...
and I voted for the Helms-Burton legislation to be tough on companies
that deal with him" (quoted in Wallsten 2004). So, if it is unlikely that the
United States would drop its trade embargo on Cuba in the near future,
would Canada be willing to join in the embargo for the sake of lifting
internal border controls with the U.S.?
There are similar challenges for developing a common visa policy. In
order to enter the United States, visitors from all but the twenty-seven
Visa Waiver Program countries and Canada must apply for and receive a
visa. The Visa Waiver Program has specific requirements of states as dis-
cussed above and states may be added or dropped from the program.
Canada has similar policies exempting nationals of some states from the
requirement to have a visa for entry. The United States and Canadian
exemption lists do not, however, coincide. For example, nationals of Bot-
swana, the Republic of Korea, Mexico and residents of Hong Kong and a
host of British dependencies and Commonwealth countries do not need a
visa to enter Canada but these countries are not in the U.S. Visa Waiver
Program (see table 1).
TABLE 1
COMPARISON OF VISA FREE TRAVEL TO THE U.S.
AND CANADA'





































St. Kitts and Nevis
St. Lucia
St. Vincent










United Kingdom United Kingdom i
Anguilla, Bermuda, British Virgin
Islands, Cayman Islands, Falkland
Islands, Gibraltar, Montserrat, Pitcairn,
St. Helena or the Turks and Caicos
Islandsiv
'See U.S. Department of State, Visa Waiver Program, available at http://www.travel.
state.gov/visa/temp/without/without 1990.html#15 (last visited Sept. 10, 2005); see
also Canadian "Visitor Visa Exemptions," Citizenship and Immigration Canada,
Countries and Territories Whose Citizens Require Visas in Order to Enter Canada as
Visitors, available at http://www.cic.gc.ca/english/visit/visas.html (last visited Sept. 10,
2005).
i Persons holding a valid and subsisting Special Administrative Region passport
issued by the Government of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of the
People's Republic of China.
i' British citizens and British Overseas Citizens who are re-admissible to the United
Kingdom
" Citizens of these British dependent territories who derive their citizenship through
birth, descent, registration or naturalization.
Given that visa-free travel to Canada not only reflects strong historical
ties but also corresponds to major tourist flows and business relation-
ships, how realistic would it be for Canada to cut its visa exemption list to
that of the United States? Given that after September 11, 2001, members
of Congress had entertained the idea of eliminating the Visa Waiver Pro-
gram all together, it is unlikely that major expansion of the Visa Waiver
list to encompass the Canadian list is politically feasible in the near fu-
ture. Moreover, even if Congressional support emerges for adding partic-
ular countries to the Visa Waiver Program, such as the recent
introduction of Congressional resolution in support of Poland's petition
for visa-free travel, these countries might not coincide with the Canadian
list - thereby widening rather than narrowing the discrepancies among
the visa exemption lists of both countries. Even if the United States were
to expand its visa waiver list as Canada's contracted, those countries ad-
ded would have to meet biometric passport requirements that EU mem-
ber states will have difficulty meeting in the near future. In light current
political dynamics, would it be politically feasible for Canada to require
visas of fellow members of the British Commonwealth or the rich Hong
Kong Chinese investors that Canada so successfully recruited to immi-
grate to Canada in the 1990s?
Without even moving onto the issues of harmonizing asylum policies
and establishing an integrated information system, the political barriers
to a customs union or common visa policy between the United States and
Canada will be difficult to surmount. It is possible that leaders of both
countries may some day overcome these obstacles, but unlikely within the
timeframe of the border security legislation passed by the U.S. Congress.
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V. CONCLUSION
Smart borders are not just a matter of deploying hardware and
software; they require international cooperation - and lots of it. Existing
smart border agreements lay out an agenda for extensive international
cooperation, but even more cooperation will be necessary to collect the
necessary data for the smart border concept to work in practice. The
"revolution in border security" that moves from smart borders to virtual
borders, ironically, requires significant physical infrastructure invest-
ments at or near the border in order to work as envisioned. International
cooperation can also reduce the overall costs of necessary infrastructure,
however, international cooperation in joint border infrastructure devel-
opment and joint inspections may be too controversial politically in the
immediate future. The upshot: significant economic and political barriers
to implementing the smart borders concept remain outstanding.
An alternative to making borders smarter is to get rid of borders alto-
gether within a North American perimeter. If policymakers are con-
vinced that lifting internal border controls by establishing a North
American perimeter is the best way to proceed, it makes little sense to
invest billions of dollars in acquiring land and building infrastructure at
the border only to have cars and trucks speed through abandoned facili-
ties after border controls are lifted. If a customs union, harmonized visa
policy, and harmonized asylum policy are judged to be politically feasible
in the next few years, then those policymakers who believe in the North
American perimeter idea should press forward and begin harmonizing
policies immediately before billions are wasted on border infrastructure.
If a North American perimeter is not realistic politically, yet still held
out as an alternative to building physical infrastructure, the hope for a
North American perimeter could reduce political support for the in-
creases in budgets, taxes, and fees necessary to realize the "smart bor-
ders" vision in practice. Rather than taking an either/or position, one
could advocate moving forward with the smart borders initiatives while at
the same time reducing discrepancies in customs duties, harmonizing visa
and asylum policies, as well as building up border control capabilities at
external border of the North American community (see, e.g., Dobson
2002: 30, Hufbauer and Vega-Canovas 2003). This is a very reasonable
strategy but political capital is not infinite. Political leaders must pick and
choose their battles.
If business groups support politicians who tell them what they want to
hear about borders disappearing behind a North American perimeter and
withhold their support from politicians who call for raising taxes and fees
to build more bridges, exit lanes, and exit booths at the border, as well as
hiring more inspectors to staff them, it is unlikely that border controls
meeting the security requirements set by the U.S. Congress will come into
being. If voters withdraw support from politicians who call on all Canadi-
ans to enroll in US-VISIT and who call on U.S. citizens to accept pass-
ports with fingerprint biometrics, it is unlikely that border controls
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meeting the security requirements set by the U.S. Congress will come into
being. If politicians will not expend the necessary political capital and
business leaders and citizenries do not support them, it is more likely that
a core part of the "smart borders" approach, US-VISIT, will follow in the
path of the entry-exit system mandated by 1996 legislation - partial de-
ployment that ultimately cannot effectively achieve its objectives.
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